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Abstract: This paper analyzes the creation of an export consortium among small 
and medium sized enterprises (SME) by the State. A hidden information principal 
agent model is introduced to explain the presence of SME export consortiums. 
The State (principal) can not observe the random realization of the firm’s (agent) 
disutility from effort. We introduce a setting where the informational asymmetry is 
post-contractual. The contract specifies the subsidy and effort levels that result from 
different announcements of the state by the firm. By means of the subsidy payments, 
the revelation of firms’ competitiveness can be achieved. The results obtained are 
that subsidies are ex post inefficient and they can constraint the participation of the 
less competitive firms to the export consortium.
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1. Introduction
Cooperation plays an important role in the survival of many small and medium 
sized businesses (Fuller-Love and Thomas 2004; Rauch 2001, Kosacoff and López 2000; 
Oughton and Whittam 1997). The network structure facilitates the common use of 
resources. Horizontal cooperation among firms is considered a major factor of profitability 
and technological innovation in many industries (Bloch 1995; Goyal and Joshi 2003). 
The adoption of common standards, exchange of information and shared use of common 
facilities are all examples of cooperation in which firms may increase their profits. 
Building public programs to encourage small and medium sized enterprises (SME) 
networking for export is a main State issue. Export Consortiums are a regular case 
of alliances for export. In particular, an export consortium can be regarded as a set of 
interrelated firms that share a common objective and act independently fostering their 
strengths and minimizing their weaknesses to enter the international market. According 
to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) an export 
consortium is a voluntary association of firms to promote goods and services exports of its 
members. An export consortium is a formal organization that promotes medium to long 
term strategic cooperation among firms, and organizes joint activities to facilitate foreign 
markets access. Most consortia are non-profit entities, and members retain their financial, 
legal, managerial and commercial autonomy. So, despite their participation in the export 
consortia, member firms do not give up any control over their business to others. This is 
the main difference between consortia and other types of strategic alliances.
The types of consortiums can differ according to their objectives: 
- Consortiums for promotion: participation in trade fairs or inter-firm missions for 
catalogue publications, research on international market, legal consulting, financial 
assistance, and training.
- Consortiums for selling: building investment and marketing plans, market 
identification, trade mark creation, production process optimization, and contact 
with supporting international commerce entities. 
There are many reasons that foster the development of export consortiums between 
firms. Most of them are: a) production costs reduction, b) export supply increase to 
gain international market and diversification, c) less uncertainty in international market 
operations, d) new business contacts, e) seasonal sales cycle’s reduction, f) better 
positioning in arrangements with public authorities, g) regional economies development. 
Apart from that, some difficulties arise on export consortiums implementation. For 
instance, the presence of reciprocal distrust between involved parties and the managers’ 
risk aversion.  Besides, there are some main reasons for their failure, such as heterogeneity 
of firms’ sizes, absence of a correct mechanism to select firms (in terms of techniques, 
financing, commerce, etc), and cultural differences, among others.
Networking can be regarded as a new institution capable of reaching the international 
market, for instance via export consortiums. However, it is arguable if a network is 
an institution, as some authors implicitly state. If a network of firms is truly a social 
institution, it is the simplest and the most primitive. Social institutions are more complex 
than networks, with a cultural superstructure of rules and a set of stable social relationships 
(CEPAL 2007).
Empirical evidence on export consortiums in developed countries is pretty varied. In 
Italy, there are 300 export consortiums, nearly 7000 SME are associated, and its exports 
represent 9% of the Italian ones. Around 100 of these consortiums are FEDEREXPORT 
(Italian Federation of Export Consortiums) members. In Spain, the ICEX (Spanish 
Federation of External Commerce) has supported the creation of about 200 export 
consortiums between 1985 and 2000. In developing countries, experiences are limited 
or rare. In Argentine, SME have a reduced export conduct (Yoguel and Boscherini 1996; 
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Kantis 1994) and we find few empirical studies as a result of inappropriate data bases. In 
Alderete (2007) some explanatory factors of export conduct in Argentinean small and 
medium enterprises are explored. The model estimated shows that the export probability 
is associated with some of the factors described by the theory, finding variables linked to 
the use of new information and communication technologies (ICT).
To shed light on export consortiums in Argentina, between 1983 and 1991 fifty two 
export consortiums were built, but most of them disappeared in the nineties as a result 
of the devaluation. From 1998, informal consortiums were created, around 100 in the 
whole country that represents 90% of the existing ones, with 750 firms and mainly mono-
sectorials. The Argentinean pound devaluation in 2001 promoted firm’s exports, for 
instance, in the food industry. Lahore SA and Modesto Bertoloni SA were members of the 
new export model in the milk industry. These firms joined their efforts to export 12 tons 
of hard reggiano cheese to EEUU in 2005. Their relationship started in APYMEL (Milk 
SMEs Association) and in the Argendairy export consortium, where small and medium 
sized enterprises export goal and ewe soft cheese. The firms had to homogenize cheese 
production, by sharing a qualified cheese consultant. Small and medium enterprises 
join to reach enough production scale for export. Other similar cheese export group 
was PYLACOR, from Córdoba Province. There other export consortium experiences in 
Argentina, for instance, small potatoes producers from Córdoba Province, potato seeds 
producers from Chubut Province, a small group of meet producers exporting with “trace 
ability” to a hotel chain in the Canarias Islands. Other export groups’ experiences come 
from Fundación Export-ar and Bank Boston, such as honey, fish, dry fruits and onions 
export groups. Due to the small size of these producers, building export consortiums 
should not be considered a risky or anticompetitive practice. 
Being a SME does not necessarily mean lack of quality but of quantity. “In the frame 
of complexity generated by the openness of local productive systems to global markets, 
the “spontaneous associations” become more rare and difficult. Usually, the obstinate 
entrepreneur’s individualism stops projects that would benefit the productive fabric and 
its economic community (Boscherini and Poma 2000: page 27)”.
This paper employs a theoretical perspective on mechanism design to build associative 
structures of SME, for instance export consortiums. Through export consortium firms 
have an opportunity to exploit competitive advantages. Unfortunately, informational 
asymmetries arise in this business relationship. Even when informational asymmetries 
do not exist at the time of contracting, the parties to a contract often anticipate that 
asymmetries will develop sometime after the contract is signed. The principal-agent 
model is a common framework for studying such a problem. The party who has the 
bargaining power to design the contract terms is referred to as the principal and the 
other party the agent. It is usually assumed that the agent possesses private information 
unobservable by the principal. 
In the literature of economic theory there are two distinguishable situations known 
as the principal agent problem. We can distinguish whether the private information bears 
on: a) what the agent does, the decision he takes (hidden action). In which the problem is 
to motivate the agent to take an appropriate hidden action (his effort); b) who the agent 
is, what his characteristics are (hidden information). This situation consists in motivating 
the agent to take an appropriate observable action (his report) on the basis of hidden 
information (Arrow, 1985; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Grossman and Hart, 1993). 
This information would influence how the principal values the agent’s actions. Within 
the realm of contract theory, relevant situations include a seller who is better informed 
than a buyer about the cost of producing a specific good.
In each of these situations, having private information gives the player possessing 
it a potential strategic advantage in his dealings with the other player. In both cases, the 
principal faces the problem of providing incentives for the agent to take the desired action, 
but the solution methods turn out to be drastically different.
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In general these informational problems prevent society from achieving the first best 
allocation of resources that could be possible in a world where all information would 
be common knowledge.
Some authors (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987) use moral hazard to refer to either of 
the hidden action or hidden information variants of the principal agent problem. Here, 
however, we use the term in the original sense. Although many real world situations 
combine moral hazard and hidden information problems, the hidden action- hidden 
information dichotomy serves as a useful tool for a better understanding of this model. 
Our purpose is to consider the problem of hidden information lonely. In order to reach 
an efficient use of economic resources, some information rent must be given up to 
the privately informed agent. At the optimal second-best contract, the principal trades 
off his desire to reach allocative efficiency against the costly information rent given 
up to the agent to induce information revelation. Implicit here is the idea that there 
exists a legal framework for this contractual relationship. The limitation of the model 
is that we avoid that monitoring the effort level exerted by the agent is a common 
moral hazard problem. 
We consider the hidden information case as a special problem in export consortiums 
where firms do not know their true costs of exporting or competitiveness levels (disutility 
of effort), although the firm takes an observable action (effort): production for export. 
For most of firms, exporting by means of an export consortium is their first experience 
in the international market. Many firms could not individually achieve the international 
market due to their reduced scale of production. The cost of exporting information is 
privately known once the consortium is exporting and the contract signed. This hidden 
information is especially prevalent in the international market, where entrepreneurs may 
not have a proven track record. The cost of exporting goes beyond the production cost, 
which the firm may probably know, and includes, managerial and promotion costs.
For example, consider a firm who has better information about his exporting costs 
than the principal. By behaving as if he had high costs, the firm can seek to induce the 
principal to pay him more than she would if she knew he had low costs. That is, he has 
an incentive to use his superior information to capture an “information rent.” Of course, 
the principal is aware of this possibility; so, if she has the right to propose the contract 
between them, she will propose a contract that works to reduce this information rent.
The problem addressed in this paper is faced by manufacturers of many industries 
with an export activity. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a 
hidden information principal agent model to determine the optimal contracts for each 
type of the export consortium member firms. Two theoretical cases are analyzed in the 
corresponding subsections. In section 3, we elaborate a simulation exercise to illustrate 
the results obtained by the theoretical model. 
Usually, the cooperative behavior of small and medium sized firms is described as a 
rational, conscious and planned process. If this were the case, there should be a model 
capable of identifying those significant factors on inter-firm cooperation propensity. 
By studying export consortiums among small and medium enterprises using a hidden 
information principal agent model, this paper contributes to the economic theory of 
networks in SME.
2. The Model
The State (principal) is searching firms (agents) to build an export consortium. The 
firms’ level of effort, called e, is fully observable (for instance, production for export that 
fits the international requirements and the consortium profile). What is not observable 
after the contract is signed is the random realization of the firm’s disutility from effort. 
For example, a firm can become aware of having networking skills and competitiveness 
that turn a high effort into a relative low disutility of effort.
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To avoid restrictions coming from the analysis with a continuum of types, we focus in 
a simple model with two types of firms: the competitive (firm h) and the non-competitive 
(firm l) ones. 
There are different types of firms according to their competitiveness level, 
θi, which can take two possible values:θl are the less competitive firms in the 
international market and θh are the most competitive ones. In this case, θh > θl  
and Prob (θh ) = λ ∈ (0,1).
We suppose that the level of effort e can be measured by a one-dimensional variable 
e ).,0( ∞∈  
The export consortium earns benefits equally distributed between the State (that 
manages the consortium) and the participant firms. Gross benefits, excluding any 
subsidy payment to the participant firm, are a simple deterministic function of effort, so 
that )( ie = δ 2/1ie , where δ∈(0,1) represents the proportion of benefit taking by the 
consortium. It is verifiable that .0)´´(0)´(;0)0( eee   and
The firm is an expected utility maximizer whose Bernoulli utility function over 
subsidies and effort, ),,( esu depends on a state of nature θ that can be discovered after 
the contract is signed and that only the firm can observe. S represents the subsidy offered 
by the principal, which is an income to the consortium participating firm.
We assume that θ∈R and we focus on a special form of ),,( esu  that is widely used 
in the literature. 
),,( esu = )),(( egsv 
The function ),( eg  measures the disutility of effort in monetary units. In 
particular, we assume that ),( eg = /2e , so that   0),0(g  and the 
following properties are verified:
0),( ege if e>0,
              = 0 0eif
0),( eg ee e
0),(  eg e
0),(  ege 0eif
                = 0 0eif
Thus, the firm is averse to increases in effort and this aversion is larger the greater the 
current level of effort. We also assume that the firm is risk averse, with v’’(.)<0.
 /)1ln((),,( 22/1 eseesu                                                               
           
Where (1-δ) represents the proportion of benefits emerged from the export 
consortium received by the participant firms.
The risk neutral State should insure the firm against fluctuations in his income. A 
contract that maximizes the surplus available in the relationship (and hence the State’s 
payoff) must make the level of firm effort responsive to the disutility incurred by the 
firm, that is, to the state θ. To fix ideas, we first illustrate how these goals are accomplished 
when θ is observable; we then turn to an analysis of the problems that arise when θ is 
observed only by the firm. 
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A. Case: θ observable
If θ is observable, a contract can directly specify the firm’s level of effort and subsidy, 
contingent in each realization of θ.  Thus, a complete information contract consists of 
two pairs of subsidy-effort: +∈ RxRes hh ),( for state θh  and +∈ RxRes ll ),(  for state 
θl . The State optimally chooses these pairs to solve the following problem:










0)/)1ln(( 22/1  hhhhh eseU                                                        (2)
(Reservation utility constraint of the most competitive firm)
0)/)1ln(( 22/1  lllll eseU                                                          (3)
(Reservation utility constraint of the less competitive firm)
Where 0== lh UU  represents both types of firm’s reservation utility level, that 
is, the utility level they must receive to accept the consortium’s contract. We suppose 
that firms’ participation will provide them the same level of utility reach outside. The 
participation constraint shows that the State can not force them to participate, so the 
expected utility of each firm must be at least equal to its reservation utility.
Solution:
From constraints (2) and (3) we deduce:
,0)/)1ln(( 22/1  iiii ese  if 1/)1(
22/1  iiii ese  , then
2/12 )1(/1 llll ees                                                                              (4)
2/12 )1(/1 hhhh ees                                                                             (5)
Replacing these expressions in the principal’s maximizing function we obtain:









Up                                                 (7)
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Up                                                 (8)
From (7) and (8) we obtain   3/24/1 hhe  ;   3/24/1 lle 
Substituting these terms into (4) and (5) we get:
3/43/1 )4/1(1 hhs  -
3/1).4/1)(1( h = 1+ )63.0)1(16.0().4/1(
3/1  h
3/43/1 )4/1(1 lls  -
3/1).4/1)(1( l =1+ )63.0)1(16.0().4/1(
3/1  l
Since θh> θl , then lh ee >  and lh ss > .
Because the marginal cost of effort is less in state θh than in state θl , the contract 
determines that the effort must be superior in state θh  For the subsidies to be different 
( lh ss = )1≠ and effort dependent, it must be verified that (1-δ) < 0,25 Thus, firms 
must get 25% of the consortium’s benefits as much.
The menu of contracts with θ observable is:
),( hh es = (
3/43/1 )4/1(1 h -
3/1).4/1)(1( h ;   3/24/1 h )
),( ll es ( 3/43/1 )4/1(1 l - 3/1).4/1)(1( l ;   3/24/1 l )
In a principal-agent model, with an observable state variable θ, the optimal contract involves 
an effort level *ie in state θi such that u’(
*
ie )= eg (
*
ie , θi) and fully insures the firm, setting 
its subsidy in each state θi at the level 
*




ie , θi ))=u .
Thus, with a strictly risk adverse firm, a first best contract is characterized by two 
basic features: first, the State fully insures the firm against any risk; second, the State 
requires the firm to produce to the point at which the marginal benefit of effort exactly 
equals its marginal cost. Because the marginal cost of effort is lower in state θh than in 
state θl , the contract calls for more effort in state θh .
B. Case: θ Non observable
The desires both to insure the risk-averse firm and to elicit the proper levels of effort 
come into conflict when informational asymmetries are present. Suppose, for example, 
that the State offers the firm a contract such as the one showed in the last figure, and relies 
that the firm will reveal its true state voluntarily. However, in state θh the firm prefers 
contract ),( ** ll es to ),(
**
hh es . As a result, in state θh firm will lie to the consortium, 
claiming that it is actually state θl  And this misrepresentation causes a benefit loss to 
the consortium.
Consequently, looking for an optimal contract is a key matter. 
The revelation principle greatly simplifies the analysis of these types of contracting 
problems. According to this principle, the State can without any loss restricts contracts 
to the following form:
- After the state is realized, the firm is required to announce which state has occurred.
- The contract specifies an outcome (s(θ),e(θ)) to each possible announcement θ.
- In every state, the firm finds it optimal to report the state truthfully.
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This principle allows us to write the State’s problem as follows:
Max Up= ))(1()( 2/12/1 llhh sese                                          (9)
Subject to:
(i) 0)/)1ln(( 22/1  lllll eseU                                                     (10)
(Reservation utility constraint of the less competitive firm)
(ii) 0)/)1ln(( 22/1  hhhhl eseU                                                   
(Reservation utility constraint of the most competitive firm)
(iii) ),,(),,( hllhhh esuesU  
)/)1ln(( 22/1 hhhh ese   = )/)1ln((
22/1
hlll ese           (11) 
(Incentive Compatibility Constraint of the most competitive firm).
(iv) ),,(),,( lhhlll esuesU  
)/)1ln(( 22/1 llll ese   = )/)1ln((
22/1
lhhh ese  
(Incentive Compatibility Constraint of the less competitive firm).
The pairs ),( ll es and ),( hh es that the contract specifies are now the subsidy 
and effort levels that result from different announcements of the state by the firm, that 
is, the outcome if the firm announces that the state is θl is ( ii es , ). Constraints (i) and 
(ii) make up the reservation utility (or individual rationality) constraint for the infinitely 
risk-averse firm, if it is to accept the contract, it must be guaranteed a utility of at least u
in each state, that represents the reservation utility level, as in the case of observable θ.
Constraints (iii) and (iv) are the incentive compatibility (or truth telling or self selection) 
constraints for the firm in states θh and θl  respectively. These constraints imply that the firm 
will be induced to truth telling as long as the contract generates a lower utility if a deviation 
from the truth takes place. In (iii) the firm’s utility in state θh  is )/)1ln((
22/1
hhhh ese  
if it tells the truth, but it becomes )/)1ln(( 22/1 hlll ese    if it lies and claims that it is state 
θl . Thus, the firm will tell the truth if )/)1ln(( 22/1 hhhh ese    )/)1ln(( 22/1 hlll ese    . 
Same analysis corresponds to constraint (iv).
Furthermore, because constraints (ii) and (iv) are redundant1, the previous problem 
simplifies. In any optimal contract, we see:
(i) 
*
ll ee ≤ , that is, the firm’s effort level in state θl is no more than the level that 
would arise if θ were observable.
(ii) 
*
hh ee = , that is, the firm’s effort level in state θh is exactly equal to the level that 
would arise if θ were observable.
Consequently, the contract to be offered to the most competitive firm will lie in a 
region, where the less competitive firm doesn’t have incentives to lie (would be worse by 
claiming it’s the most competitive) and the most competitive firm would be better.
Max Up= ))(1()( 2/12/1 llhh sese                                                  (12)
Subject to:
0)/)1ln(( 22/1  lllll eseU                                                                           (13)
(Reservation utility constraint of the less competitive firm).
1 An analysis of this conclusion is presented 
in Mas-Colell and Whinston (1995), p 
495. 
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)/)1ln(( 22/1 hhhh ese   = )/)1ln((
22/1
hlll ese                                         (14) 
(Reservation compatibility constraint of the most competitive firm).
Given any subsidy-effort ),( ll es pair, the State‘s problem is to find ),( hh es that 
maximizes its profit in state θh.
We suppose that constraints (13) y (14) must bind, such that:
From (12) 0)/)1ln(( 22/1  llll ese  , then 
2/12 )1(/1 llll ees  
From (13) hhhh ese  /)1(
22/1  = hlll ese  /)1(
22/1 
Replacing ls in (13) follows:
2/1222 )1(///1 hhhhlllh eeees  
Substituting lh sands  just obtained into the principal’s maximizing function we 
obtain:
Max                                                                                                                                 (15)
















Up                                                (17)

















Each type’s subsidy is inferred from those previous levels of effort, that is:


















































In case θ is not observable lh ee >  y lh ss > ∀ δ.
The solution occurs in the point of tangency between the most competitive firm’s 
indifference curve and the state’s isoprofit curve.
Finally, in the hidden information principal agent model with an infinitely risk-averse 
firm the optimal contract sets the level of effort (production for export) in state θh (most 
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competitive firms) at its first best (full observability) level *he . Moreover, at the state of 
less competitiveness θl , the level of production for export is distorted downward from 
its first best level *le . In addition, the firm is inefficiently insured, receiving an utility 
greater than his reservation utility level in the most competitive state, and an utility 
equal to its reservation level in the less competitive state. The State’s expected payoff 
is strictly lower than the expected payoff he receives when the competitiveness state is 
observable, while the infinitely risk averse firm’s expected utility is the same as when the 
state is observable. We must observe that while the outcome here is Pareto inefficient, 
it is a constrained Pareto Optimum, there is no allocation that Pareto dominates this 
outcome and can be achieved by a central authority who can not observe the level of 
competitiveness of the firm.
3. Simulation exercise
In this section, we simulate the results acquired by the hidden information model. At 
first, we state some possible values to the parameters according to the assumptions of the 
model. Then, we simulate the contract under full observability of the competitiveness 
level and then under nonobservability.
A. Case θ Observable
In this section, we simulate the results acquired by the hidden information model. At 
first, we state some possible values to the parameters according to the assumptions of the 
model. Then, we simulate the contract under full observability of the competitiveness 
level and then under nonobservability.
First, we take the definitions of ),( hh es  and ),( ll es from section 2.1. By defining 
possible values of θh and θl we get possible values of the contracts. As can be seen in 
Table 1, sh>sl for all eh>el. Moreover, to get positives values of the principal expected 
utility we must constrain θh and θl.
Next, we take a pair of possible values of the state levels, for instance θh=10; θl=9.5 
and observe others parameters changes:
Table 1 –  Levels of subsidy payments (S) and efforts (e) as functions of states θh and θl.
δ θh θl eh el λ Sh Sl Uh Ul Up
0.8 0.2 0.1 0.136 0.085 0.5 1.018 1.015 -0.633 -0.708 -0.671
0.8 0.8 0.5 0.342 0.250 0.5 1.029 1.025 -0.427 -0.507 -0.467
0.8 2 1 0.630 0.397 0.5 1.040 1.031 -0.246 -0.387 -0.316
0.8 5 4 1.160 1.000 0.5 1.054 1.050 -0.057 -0.105 -0.081
0.8 6 5 1.310 1.160 0.5 1.057 1.054 -0.027 -0.065 -0.046
0.8 8 7 1.587 1.452 0.5 1.063 1.060 0.008 -0.017 -0.004
0.8 10 9 1.842 1.717 0.5 1.068 1.066 0.018 0.000 0.009
0.8 12 11 2.080 1.963 0.5 1.072 1.070 0.010 -0.005 0.003
0.8 14 13 2.305 2.194 0.5 1.076 1.074 -0.013 -0.025 -0.019
Source: The Author.
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a) Changes in δ 
From Table 2, we can infer that if and only if δ≥0.8 then sh>sl, for all eh>el. 
Table 2 – Effect of changes in δ (proportion of benefits taken by the State) on the 
levels of subsidy payments and efforts 
δ eh El λ Sh Sl Uh Ul Up
0.1 1.842016 1.78009184 0.2 0.117814 0.132769 0.017907 0.000651 0.004102
0.2 1.842016 1.78009184 0.2 0.253535 0.26619 0.017907 0.000651 0.004102
0.3 1.842016 1.78009184 0.2 0.389256 0.39961 0.017907 0.000651 0.004102
0.4 1.842016 1.78009184 0.2 0.524977 0.53303 0.017907 0.000651 0.004102
0.5 1.842016 1.78009184 0.2 0.660698 0.66645 0.017907 0.000651 0.004102
0.6 1.842016 1.78009184 0.2 0.796419 0.79987 0.017907 0.000651 0.004102
0.7 1.842016 1.78009184 0.2 0.93214 0.93329 0.017907 0.000651 0.004102
0.8 1.842016 1.78009184 0.2 1.06786 1.06671 0.017907 0.000651 0.004102
0.9 1.842016 1.78009184 0.2 1.203581 1.20013 0.017907 0.000651 0.004102
Source: The Author.
b) Changes in λ
In Table 3, we observe that the principal’s utility Up is an increasing function of λ. 
Thus, the larger the probability of being a high competitive firm (probability near one) 
is, the larger the State expected utility will be.
Table 3 – Effect of changes in λ (Probθ= θh ) on the levels of subsidy payments 
and efforts
δ eh El λ Sh Sl Uh Ul Up
0.8 1.842016 1.78009184 0.1 1.06786 1.06671 0.017907 0.000651 0.002376
0.8 1.842016 1.78009184 0.2 1.06786 1.06671 0.017907 0.000651 0.004102
0.8 1.842016 1.78009184 0.3 1.06786 1.06671 0.017907 0.000651 0.005827
0.8 1.842016 1.78009184 0.4 1.06786 1.06671 0.017907 0.000651 0.007553
0.8 1.842016 1.78009184 0.5 1.06786 1.06671 0.017907 0.000651 0.009279
0.8 1.842016 1.78009184 0.6 1.06786 1.06671 0.017907 0.000651 0.011004
0.8 1.842016 1.78009184 0.7 1.06786 1.06671 0.017907 0.000651 0.01273
0.8 1.842016 1.78009184 0.8 1.06786 1.06671 0.017907 0.000651 0.014455
Source: The Author.
B. Case θ Non observable
In this case, we take the definitions of ),( hh es  and ),( ll es from section 2.2. Following 
the previous process, we determine possible values of θh and θl.. By setting δ=0.8 and 
λ=0.5 as parameters, we observe (Table 4) that since θh>θl, then eh>el and sh>sl.
Table 4 –  Levels of subsidy payments and efforts when δ=0.8 and λ=0.5
δ λ θh Θl eh el Sh Sl Up
0.8 0.5 9.55 9.5 1.786332 1.773906 1.069492 1.06486 0.000191
0.8 0.5 9.65 9.6 1.798781 1.786397 1.069707 1.065106 0.003693
0.8 0.5 9.75 9.7 1.811186 1.798844 1.06992 1.06535 0.007171
0.8 0.5 9.85 9.8 1.823549 1.811249 1.070131 1.065592 0.010624
0.8 0.5 9.95 9.9 1.835871 1.823611 1.070341 1.065833 0.014055
0.8 0.5 10.05 10 1.848151 1.835931 1.070551 1.066071 0.017462
0.8 0.5 10.15 10.1 1.86039 1.848211 1.070759 1.066308 0.020847
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0.8 0.5 10.25 10.2 1.872589 1.860449 1.070965 1.066544 0.024209
0.8 0.5 10.35 10.3 1.884749 1.872648 1.071171 1.066778 0.027549
0.8 0.5 10.45 10.4 1.89687 1.884807 1.071375 1.06701 0.030868
0.8 0.5 10.55 10.5 1.908952 1.896927 1.071578 1.06724 0.034166
0.8 0.5 10.65 10.6 1.920996 1.909008 1.07178 1.067469 0.037443
0.8 0.5 10.75 10.7 1.933002 1.921051 1.071981 1.067697 0.040699
0.8 0.5 10.85 10.8 1.944971 1.933057 1.072181 1.067923 0.043935
0.8 0.5 10.95 10.9 1.956904 1.945025 1.07238 1.068147 0.047151
0.8 0.5 11.05 11 1.9688 1.956957 1.072578 1.06837 0.050347
0.8 0.5 11.15 11.1 1.98066 1.968853 1.072774 1.068592 0.053524
Source: The Author.
4. Graphic example
On the space of two dimensions (subsidy-effort) we illustrate the optimal contracts 
under full observability and under non-observability of the state, subject to the following 
conditions: θh=10; θl=9.5; δ=0.8 and λ=0.5.
A. Case θ Observable











es  . Taking the effort levels as given, we 
deduce the subsidy payment to each type of firm. We search for the tangency point between 
the firm indifference curve and the State utility for each possible values of θh and θl.
In Table 5 and Figures 1 and 2, we observe that the subsidy payment and the principal 
utility in state θl  are equal (1.0607) at the level of effort 1.76. Besides, in state θh tangency 
occurs at the level of effort 1.85, where subsidy and utility are equal to 1.0702, which is 
larger than the level obtained in state θl .
Table 5 –  The optimal contract with full observability of θ (grey cells)
e Sh Sl Uh Ul
0 1.0000 1.0000 -0.0179 -0.0007
0.05 0.9555 0.9555 0.1610 0.1782
0.1 0.9378 0.9378 0.2351 0.2523
0.15 0.9248 0.9249 0.2919 0.3092
0.2 0.9146 0.9148 0.3399 0.3571
0.25 0.9063 0.9066 0.3821 0.3993
0.3 0.8995 0.8999 0.4203 0.4375
0.4 0.8895 0.8904 0.4881 0.5053
0.45 0.8861 0.8872 0.5187 0.5360
0.5 0.8836 0.8849 0.5478 0.5650
1 0.9000 0.9053 0.7821 0.7993
1.7 1.0282 1.0434 1.0252 1.0424
1.75 1.0417 1.0578 1.0404 1.0576
1.76 1.0444 1.0607 1.0434 1.0607
1.8 1.0557 1.0727 1.0554 1.0727
1.85 1.0702 1.0882 1.0702 1.0875
1.9 1.0853 1.1043 1.0848 1.1021
1.95 1.1010 1.1210 1.0992 1.1165
2 1.1172 1.1382 1.1135 1.1307
Source: The Author.
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B. Case θ Non observable
In this case, we analyze the problem under non-observability of the state. Thus, 
the definitions of sh and sl come from the constraints of the problem, that is, the 
participation constraint from the less competitive firm and the incentive compatibility 
constraint from the most competitive firm. In this particular case, for θl=9.5, we get
2/12 .2.05.9/1 eess lh  .
From Table 6 and Figures 3 and 4, we observe that the subsidy payment and the 
principal utility in state θl are equal (1.088) at the level of effort 1.85. Besides, in state θh tangency occurs at the level of effort 1.9, where subsidy and utility are equal to 1.10, 
which is larger than the level obtained in state θl .
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Table 6 – The optimal contract with non observability of θ (grey cells)
e sh sl Uh Ul
0 1.000 1.000 -0.002 -0.0001
0.05 0.956 0.956 0.177 0.1788
0.1 0.938 0.938 0.251 0.2528
0.15 0.925 0.925 0.308 0.3097
0.25 0.907 0.907 0.398 0.3999
0.5 0.885 0.885 0.563 0.5656
1 0.905 0.905 0.798 0.7999
1.25 0.941 0.941 0.892 0.8943
1.5 0.992 0.992 0.978 0.9727
1.75 1.058 1.058 1.056 1.058
1.8 1.073 1.073 1.071 1.0732
1.85 1.088 1.088 1.088 1.086
1.86 1.091 1.091 1.089 1.0909
1.87 1.095 1.095 1.092 1.0938
1.88 1.098 1.098 1.095 1.0968
1.89 1.101 1.101 1.098 1.0997
1.95 1.121 1.121 1.115 1.1170
2 1.138 1.138 1.129 1.1312
Source: The Author.
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5. Final Remarks
In the second approach the Liu,  Song and Romilly’s (1997)  methodology is used 
to test if any causal relationship between integrated series exists, but using the Hatemi-J 
lag’s test in order to estimate the correct VAR’s order. As stated, the first main study’s 
objective is to examine the causal relationship -and its direction- between the Mexican 
GDP and tourism arrivals. Moreover the second aim is to prove the relationship between 
private consumption and tourism arrivals. 
Export consortiums are considered one of the main tools for inter-firm cooperation, as 
they can increase SME exports’ competitiveness and consolidate its products and services 
in the foreign markets, by reducing internationalization processes costs.
Even though the concept of networks between SME for export is pretty clear, building 
a successful export consortium is not an easy task. The attempts to establish group of 
firms for export use to fail, due to lack of information and skills. Developing countries, 
in particular, do not have enough experience in consortiums and are embedded in 
regulatory and institutional weak frames to promote export consortiums between small 
and medium enterprises.
This paper develops a mechanism design to build associative structures of SME, 
especially export consortiums. By participating in export consortium firms can exploit 
its competitive advantages. According to this hidden information principal agent model, 
the State can not observe each firm’s disutility from effort. Therefore, subsidy payments 
can accomplish the objective of revealing the participants’ competitiveness levels.
Although hidden information models are not a new theoretical tool, the paper’s 
contribution consists in trying to explain SME cooperation for export from a different 
theoretical perspective. Politic implications of the paper are good, since it establishes the 
role of the State in promoting cooperation among firms for export. Moreover, we show 
that subsidy payments are ex-post inefficient as a result of the screening effect, if we 
assume the presence of firms with different competitiveness levels. A possible outcome 
of the model is that it insures that only the most competitive firms would be members 
of the export consortium. Even though avoiding less competitive firms participation 
could be positive from a planner’s point of view, it constraints the smaller firms (that 
are almost usually the less competitive firms) opportunities of networking for export. 
These firms suffer from a negative feedback: less competitiveness leads to fewer subsidies 
for export decreasing their incentives to network and finally causing lower levels of 
competitiveness. 
Besides, the increasing role of SMEs in the global economy raises a number of issues 
for industrial organization theory and policy. A question of central importance concerns 
the contribution of the export consortium to industrial efficiency and competitiveness. 
Due to the fact that export consortiums are a particular inter-firm cooperation case, 
one of the future objectives of the research consist in developing some model where the 
State do not take place and compare its results with this one. 
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